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Abstract
Recent influential papers analyze labor supply behavior of taxi drivers (Camerer
et al., 1997; and Crawford and Meng, 2011) and suggest that reference-dependence
preferences have an important influence on drivers’ labor-supply decisions. In the
spirit of previous works I analyze the labor supply behavior of Bologna Pizza De-
livery Vendors. Unlike previous papers, I am able to identify an exogenous and
transitory change in labor demand. Using high frequency data on orders and rain-
fall as an exogenous demand shifter, I invariably find that reference-dependent
preferences play no role in their labor’ supply decisions and the behavior of pizza
vendors is perfectly consistent with the predictions of the standard model of labor’
supply. The difference in findings is due to differences in empirical approach rather
than in the data used.
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thank Maria Bigoni, Matteo Cervellati, Efrem Castelnuovo, Juan J. Dolado, Irene Ferrari, Margherita
Fort, Riccardo Ghidoni, Giovanni Mastrobuoni, Chiara Monfardini, Giacomo Pasini, Alfonso Rosolia,
Giulio Zanella and seminar participants at Bologna, EUI, BOMOPAV 2014 Meeting and XIII Brucchi
Luchino Workshop.
1 Introduction
There is a growing list of influential papers that documents a series of behavioral anoma-
lies that question the basic assumption of standard economic models. Several studies
provide evidence of the fact that individuals tend to overweight the present than the fu-
ture (Laibson, 1997), they make decision using only a subset of the available information
(Dellavigna and Pollet, 2009) and their utility is also function of the utility of other peo-
ple (Charness and Rabin, 2002). To assess the extent to which the core assumptions of
standard economic models are correct is of crucial importance for academics and policy-
makers alike. If relevant, incorporating behavioral insights in the design of public policies
not only could improve the effectiveness of existing policies but could also offer new tools
(Chetty, 2015).
The implications of behavioral biases may be particularly important in the context of
labor economics. If behavioral factors play a large role in explaining labor supply deci-
sion then policies that neglect these anomalies, are suboptimal. The current design of
income taxes (or unemployment insurance policies) is entirely based on the assumption of
standard models of labor supply: labor supply should increase in response to transitory
and positive changes in earnings opportunities. Is this assumption valid?
Until recently, empirical research aimed to investigate the relationship between workers’
effort and earnings opportunities was conducted using individual panel data available for
standard workers. However, standard workers face variations in wages that are perma-
nent, hence correlated with significant income effects. Moreover, they usually operate in
setting in which (at the intensive margin) it is not possible to set their own effort. Then,
while the external validity of these results is beyond any doubt what it is doubtful is the
identification of the underlying labor supply behavior. Due to the serious limitations in
the available data, the effort exerted by scholars to study workers labor supply decisions
was gradually diminishing. But in the last years the very large literature in economics
studying the behavior of the underlying labor supply has regained a central position in
the academic debate.
Recent influential papers analyze labor supply behavior of piece rate workers, such as
taxi drivers (Camerer et al., 1997; Farber, 2008; and Crawford and Meng, 2011) and
bike messengers (Fehr and Goette, 2007). These specific groups of workers have proven
to be the ideal candidates to investigate labor supply decision: they operate in settings
in which they face transitory changes in their earnings opportunities and they are free
to set their effort. However, despite the possibility to set their effort, these papers have
provided evidence that is in sharp contrast with the prediction of the standard model but
is consistent with alternative theories that explain labor supply decisions with reference-
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dependence preferences. Reference-dependence preferences (henceforth, RDP) models of
labor supply behavior predict that workers labor supply depends not only on earnings
opportunities as in standard neoclassical theory, but also on a target (reference point). In
the case of taxi driver, the idea is that she decides to stop driving based on having reached
the reference point (e.g. income goal) and not on whether future potential earnings are
high or low.
Crawford and Meng (2011) is the first paper that, by investigating the daily labor supply
of New York City taxi drivers, conceptualize drivers target as endogenous rational expec-
tations. Building on Ko˝szegi and Rabin’s (2006) theory of RDP, the authors estimate a
model of daily labor supply as a survival model in which at the end of each trip drivers
decide whether to continue or to stop driving. They derive a reduced-form model of the
probability of stopping as linear function of cumulative hours and cumulative income. In
order to investigate the relevance of reference-dependent behavior, they implement the
probit model including two dummy variables indicating whether hours or income exceed
the targets. Targets reflect the driver’ rational expectations in terms of hours and in-
come and represent the belief about outcomes that she might face. Since targets are
not observed, they operationalize them as functions of endogenous variables. Given the
lack of suitable demand-shifting instruments, they compute sample proxies for driver’
rational expectation using driver specific sample average income and hours prior to the
current shift, allowing them to vary across days of week in order to capture variation in
demand throughout the week. In their paper, they provide evidence of deviations from
the standard neoclassical model of worker behavior, suggesting that the behavioral com-
ponent is an important part of the labor-supply decisions of taxi drivers. However, why
effort exerted by taxi drivers varies through the day is no clear and Crawford and Meng
(and none of the previous papers) were able to identify an exogenous demand shifter that
could be used as instrument to provide credible estimates of the sign of the labor supply
elasticity.
In the spirit of previous works I analyze the labor supply behavior of Bologna Pizza
Delivery Vendors using high frequency data on orders placed over the period February
2010-July 2011. At the intensive margin (i.e. during a day), vendors, like taxi drivers,
can decide how much effort they want to exert by accepting (or not accepting) orders.
A key feature of this paper is that I am able to identify an exogenous and transitory
shift in labor demand. Among other determinants, weather conditions are one of the
key shifters of demand for pizza delivery services. Using Web search data I will provide
evidence of the fact that rainfall are a statistically significant determinant of demand of
pizza delivery. Then, unlike previous papers, I am able to instrument the effort of Pizza
delivery vendors using exogenous and transitory change in weather conditions. Using
changes in rainfall as sources of exogenous change in pizza delivery demand, I invariably
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find that vendor’s behavior is consistent with the prediction of the standard model of
labor supply. This result contrasts sharply with the results of previous studies and I
show that this difference in findings is due to differences in analytical approach rather
than in the data used.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the data
utilized in this paper and describes the labor market for Pizza Delivery Vendors. Section
3 presents the empirical results on the relevance of adverse weather condition for pizza
demand using Web searches data. In Section 4, I replicate the analysis of Crawford and
Meng (2011) using Pizza Vendors’ data and I obtain results that are consistent with those
found for taxi drivers. In Section 5, I present the empirical results obtained exploiting
the exogenous variation in rainfall and I show that the behavior of pizza delivery vendors
is perfectly consistent with the predictions of the standard model of labor supply. Section
6 concludes.
2 Data and Background
The data used in this paper consists of high frequency data on orders carried out through
an on-line takeaway pizza delivery service (henceforth, the Website). The Website acts as
a web-based intermediary between privately owned restaurants and customers (it can be
considered to be a modern variant of the Yellows Pages). The Website allows customers
to select a pizza delivery restaurant, place the order and then receive the delivery at home.
When a customer places an order, a message is sent to the delivery restaurant using a
2-way till receipt/order machine. Vendors receive the order through the machine box
and then are able to accept or reject the order. If they accept it, a confirmation message
is sent to the customer with an indication of the delivery time (set by the vendors).
Payments are collected by the vendors on delivery and for each order the Website charges
a flat commission rate.
Pizza delivery restaurants are located in Bologna and are privately owned family business.
Unlike normal restaurant, their distinguishing feature is that they do not provide table
service and the majority of customer orders are carried out by telephone or over the web.
Therefore, I observe only a part of the total demand (i.e. the orders received through
the Website) but it reasonable to assume that the two channels (telephone and web) are
positively related.
Unlike previous works, this paper investigates the labor supply behavior of a group of
workers. I consider each single restaurant as a group of workers and I will refer to
all workers of a single restaurant as vendors. Moreover, I assume that the group (in
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terms of size and composition) is constant through all the period. Given labor market
characteristics (i.e. restaurants are family business) it is reasonable to assume this to be
true. In the following section I replicate the analysis of Crawford and Meng (2011) using
pizza delivery data. Obtaining similar finding is of crucial importance because it implies
that despite the intrinsic differences between taxi drivers and pizza vendors (single vs
group of workers, settings and cities) any difference in the results is due to the different
econometric approach rather than to differences between the two settings.
2.1 Data on Pizza Sales
The Website provided me all orders placed over the period February 2010-July 2011 for
59 pizza delivery restaurants. As explained in the previous section vendors receive the
order through a machine box and then are able to accept or reject it. Rejected orders
(as consumers that weren’t able to find a taxi) are crucial to provide a credible estimate
of intertemporal substitution of labor supply (Frisch elasticity). Unfortunately, as in
previous work, in this paper I rely only on the equilibrium outcomes, due to the fact that
rejected orders weren’t recorded.
From February 2010 to July 2011 a total of 147.090 orders were observed. Figure 1 plots
the location of each pizza delivery restaurants across the city of Bologna (red dots) and
the spatial distribution of orders observed in the sample (blue dots). For each order I
have detailed information on the date and time the order was placed, the total amount of
the delivery, the distance between the restaurant and the delivery place and the expected
delivery time, that is communicated to customers when the order is accepted by the
vendors.
[Figure 1]
Daily average earnings across the whole sample are equal to 68.15 and the average number
of orders accepted in a day is around 8. Not surprisingly, daily earnings opportunities
vary across days of the week and across months. Earnings opportunities are higher during
winter and during the weekend (for example, daily earnings and daily orders observed
during Sundays of January are almost twice that of the overall sample). Figure 2 contains
kernel density of the distribution of orders over the day. The number of order received
varies greatly throughout the day: orders are concentrated around lunch breaks (generally
12:30–3:00 pm) and dinner hours (generally 6:30–9:00 pm). This pattern highlights the
crucial role of meal times in demand of pizza delivery services.
[Figure 2]
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2.2 Weather Data
Data on weather conditions over the entire period in the city of Bologna are provided by
the Regional Agency for the Protection of the Environment (ARPA) of Emilia Romagna.
The data on hourly precipitation is drawn from a meteorological station located in the city
centre of Bologna (Bologna Urbana). Note that the city of Bologna, with a population
of about 384.000 and a total area of about 140.7 km2, is relatively small1.
[Figure 3]
Figure 3 plots the number of days per month with measurable precipitation. From Febru-
ary 2010 to July 2011 the number of rainy days (defined as days with 1 mm or more of
rain) is about 206.
3 The Demand for Pizza Delivery in Bologna
Demand for pizza delivery fluctuates on a daily basis due to demand shocks caused by
day-of-the-week effects, sport events, holidays, etc. Among others, weather conditions are
one of the key shifters of demand for pizza delivery services. Workers of the food delivery
industry recognize that rainfall are strongly correlated with positive short-run fluctuations
in demand for pizza delivery services. For example, in 2012, while announcing a rise in
firm’ profits the CEO of Domino’s Pizza2, Lance Batchelor said ”When the weather turns
nasty we always see sales turn upwards”.
In this section I use Web search volume to provide evidence of the positive effect of
adverse weather condition on pizza demand. Recently several papers have demonstrated
that Web search data correlates in near real time with individual activity and that search
counts are predictive of economic outcomes, including unemployment levels (Ettredge
et al., 2005), home sales (Wu and Brynjolfsson, 2013) and consumers activities such as
movie attendance and music sales (Goel et al., 2010). In the same spirit, I use daily
Web search volume to derive information about the elasticity of pizza demand to rain
conditions. Pizza related search queries are provided by Google Trends. Google Trends
provides me an index3 that indicates the daily volume of queries entered into Google that
1To give just one example, in New York there are over 8.4 million residents in 1,214 km2 and the
distance between Central Park (where it is located the weather station used in Crawford and Meng and
Farber) and Kennedy Airport (a pick-up location associated with the highest earnings) is of about 21.5
km
2Domino’s Pizza is an American restaurant chain and international franchise pizza delivery corpora-
tion with 145.000 employees and more than 1 billion of USD of revenue.
3Google Trends data does not report the raw level of queries for a given search term, rather, it reports
a query index, that indicates the volume of searches for the specific search term divided by the total
number of queries in a given geographic location at a certain point in time.
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includes the Italian words for ”pizza restaurant Bologna” in the area of Bologna.
Figure 4 plots the Google Trends daily index of the search ”pizza restaurant Bologna”
from February 2010 to July 2011. The fluctuation of searches is consistent with the
behavior of pizza demand: searches peak during cold seasons and follow a seasonal trend
that is compatible with pizza consumption.
[Figure 4]
I investigate to which extent adverse weather conditions affects daily Web search volume
using the following model:
log(Searchest) = β + β1Rainy Dayt + t (1)
where Searches t represents the index of searches in day t and Rainy Day is a dummy
variable that takes value equal to 1 if in the corresponding day it has rained. Column
(1) of Table (1) reports the estimation results from the specification with day of the
week, month and year dummies. As expected the coefficient of interest is positive and
statistically significant: adverse weather conditions during the day increase roughly by
6% search queries related with pizza consumption.
[Table 1]
Not surprisingly, results are robust when investigating the effect of precipitation at the
intensive margin. Results in Columns 2-4 of Table (1) present the estimates using as
alternative variable of interest the total amount of rainfall (in millimeters), the average
precipitation in the day (in millimeters) and the number of rainy hours in the day. For
example, three hours of rain are associated with an increase of around 2% in the daily
volume of pizza related queries entered into Google.
The randomness in weather events is function of precipitation intensity and time of the
day. Since meal times are among the main determinants of pizza delivery I investigate
the potential heterogeneous impact of rainfall on pizza demand during a day. Using the
distribution of the orders in my sample I have derived weights for each hour. Weights re-
flect pizza delivery demand intensity throughout the day. Hourly precipitations observed
in the day are weighted using the fraction of total orders observed in the corresponding
hour over the entire period. The underlying idea is to investigate if the impact of adverse
weather conditions varies depending on the time of the day.
Columns 1-3 of Table 2 present the estimates of the model where the variables indicating
adverse weather conditions are defined as the sum of the product between millimeters of
rain and the corresponding hour weights, as the sum of the interaction of rainy hours and
weights and as the average of the product between millimeter of rain in the day and the
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corresponding hour weights, respectively.
[Table 2]
Taken as a whole, these results demonstrate that rainfall are a statistically significant
determinant of demand of pizza delivery. The positive significant effect reported by the
estimated coefficients indicating adverse weather condition in the day, provide further
evidence of the positive effect of rain on the demand of delivery food, as discussed before.
4 Estimation of Labor Supply Models
4.1 Estimation using Crawford and Meng’ Targets
In the next section I replicate the analysis of Crawford and Meng (2011) using pizza
sales data. Obtaining similar finding is of crucial importance because it implies that
despite the intrinsic differences between taxi drivers and pizza vendors (e.g. single vs
group of workers, settings and cities) any difference in the results is due to the different
econometric approach rather than to differences between the two settings.
I depart from their analysis modelling labor’ decision of pizza vendors solely as a function
of their effort4. Pizza vendors are piece-rate workers and their labor supply decision is
about how much effort they want to exert by accepting orders. Then, as a proxy of
vendors’ effort, I use the number of order accepted in the day5
Using pizza-delivery data, I estimate a model of labor supply where the decision of stop-
ping is function of cumulative orders accepted in the day and a dummy variable indicating
whether pizza produced in the day exceeds the target. Following Crawford and Meng
(2011) I compute the target using the average number of previous orders accepted. De-
spite the presence of endogenous regressors the empirical strategy proposed by Crawford
and Meng (2011) has the advantage to isolate the neoclassical component of labor supply
from the reference-dependent effect. While the estimated coefficients of cumulative orders
provides evidence of the part of labor-supply behavior related with standard preferences,
the coefficient of the dummy indicates the variation in the continuation probability when
target is reached. If positive and statistically significant, the coefficient of the dummy
will provide evidence of target behavior by pizza vendors
4However, it is important to note that the fundamental results of this section are the qualitatively the
same when I adopt a model of labor’ supply with two targets, defined as specific sample average income
and hours prior to the current day, as the one used by Crawford and Meng (2011).
5In principle I could use the number of pizza produced or the total earnings in the day as alternative
measures of effort. The results do not change substantively.
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Table 3 contains estimates of reduced form model of stopping probability allowing jump
at the target6. In the left-hand panel targets are computed by sample averages, ven-
dors/month by vendors/month, prior to the day in question. The model in the first
column contains only cumulative orders accepted and the dummy indicate whether num-
ber of orders is above the target. In the second column the model includes controls
for vendors-day-of-the-week’ heterogeneity, month, year, hour of the day and weather
condition. In both models target coefficients suggest the presence of relevant deviation
from the standard model of labor supply and suggest that vendors are more likely to
stop working when they hit their target. At the same time, the level of orders accepted
has a significant and negative effect providing evidence of the presence of a neoclassical
component in the labor supply decision of pizza vendors. The right-hand panel reports
estimates obtained computing target by vendors, month and day of the week. Overall
the estimates confirm previous results: when the demand is higher than expected (i.e.
vendors hit their targets), vendors are more likely to end working.
[Table 3]
Despite the differences in the two settings the results presented in this section are sub-
stantially consistent with those found by Crawford and Meng (2011). Pizza vendors look
like taxi drivers in terms of inter-temporal labor supply elasticity. As for taxi drivers,
being above the target increases the probability of quit and reference-dependent prefer-
ences seem to play a key role in labor supply behavior of pizza vendors. The similarity of
findings is crucial because it implies that any differences in future results obtained with
alternative empirical strategy are due to differences in the analytic approach rather than
to differences in the two settings.
Not surprisingly, the coefficient of the dummy variable indicating whether during the
corresponding hour it was raining is negative and statistically significant. That is to say
that when earnings opportunities are temporarily high vendors behavior is consistent with
a standard model of labor supply and workers effort is positively related with transitory
variation in demand7
It should be noticed that a prediction of the role of relevance of reference dependent prefer-
ences in labor supply decision is that workers should respond differently to demand shock
if they are above the target8. Differently from Crawford and Meng (2011) I can inves-
6In the main text are presented results from unweighted regression, where sampling variation is
ignored. In order to take into account sampling variation, I produce (as in Crawford and Meng, 2011)
weighted estimates, where weights are equal to the number of observation used to compute the target.
The corresponding results are reported in Appendix 3. Results obtained with unweighted and weighted
regression are essentially the same.
7Similar results are obtained from when rain defined in millimeters.
8In the Appendix 2 I develop two alternative models of labor supply for piece-rate workers that
operate in a market with menu costs to derive theoretical predictions.
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tigate this theoretical prediction through the interaction between the dummy indicating
whether orders exceed the target and the variable indicating if in the corresponding hour
it was raining. If reference dependence plays an important role in determining vendor’s
labor supply decisions, the coefficient of the interaction term is expected to be positive
and statistically significant: if vendors have reached their target they should respond less
to an increase of pizza delivery demand.
[Table 4]
The corresponding results are reported in Table 4 and do not provide any support for
the relevance of reference dependent preferences in vendors’ labor supply decisions. The
coefficients of the interaction terms are not statistically significant at conventional levels.
When target is computed as vendors/month average orders accepted (Column 1) the point
estimate of the coefficient is negative. When target is defined as vendors/day/month
averages (Column 2) the coefficient is actually positive, as theory to predict, but far from
being significant.
Takes as a whole the results provided in this section indicate that i) pizza vendors look
like taxi drivers and target behavior seem to play a key role in their labor supply decisions
ii) adverse weather conditions are positively related with workers effort and iii) the role
of target is unclear when a truly exogenous demand shifter is used.
4.2 Estimation using Rainfall Variation
Unlike Crawford and Meng I can investigate the relevance of the target component using
demand shocks, defined in term of rainfall variation, as an instrument for earnings oppor-
tunities. In this section, I exploit the change in weather conditions to isolate exogenous
variations in vendors’ earnings opportunities. Using precipitation in the day I identify two
instruments. I compute Cumulative Rainy Hours as the number of rainy hours observed
up to that point in the day and a target variable labeled Target Rainy Hours, defined as
vendors/month and vendors/month/day of week sample average observed rain prior to
the current day as target. The first variable isolates the neoclassical component of labor
supply, while the second variable is a proxy for the vendors’ rational point expectations
of a day’s pizza demand9.
For each pizza vendors, cumulative precipitation are computed using a given hour as
starting point. The starting hour corresponds to the earliest hour at which an order was
observed over the entire sample. Thus, while the starting hours vary among vendors,
9Due to the non-trivial solution of a standard two stage regression in a probit model with multiple
endogenous variables I focus solely on the reduced form estimates. However, the information underlying
the first-stage regressions is provided in the Appendix 4.
10
it is assumed to be constant over the period. An alternative approach is to consider as
starting point the time at which the first order was observed in the day. This approach,
implicitly adopted by Crawford and Meng, allows starting hours to vary among vendors
and across days but relies on the strong assumption that the waiting time for the first
order is always equals to zero. This approach seems inconsistent with daily activity of
pizza vendors that, as for taxi drivers’ one, requires a series of preliminary steps (e.g.
preparing pizza requires, for example, a certain stable oven temperature)10.
[Table 5]
Table 5 presents the estimates of the reduced form model where the probability that ven-
dors end their work day is function of the number of rainy hours observed in the day and
a dummy variable indicating whether precipitation in the day hit the estimated target.
In the left-hand panel, vendors target is computed using vendors/month sample averages
up to but not including the day in question. When defined as the sum of previous pre-
cipitation the coefficient of cumulative rain is negative and statistically significant. This
results is similar to the evidence obtained in Section 4.1 and suggests the presence of a
neoclassical component in the labor supply decision of pizza vendors.However, the esti-
mated coefficient of dummy variables indicating whether precipitation in the day exceeds
the target is close to 0 and far from being statistically significant. Similar findings are re-
ported in the right-hand panel, where exogenous target is computed using vendors/month
and day-of-week sample averages up to but not including the day in question. These es-
timates are inconsistent with previous results and provide no support for the relevance
of reference-dependence preferences in the labor-supply story of pizza vendors.
In Table 6 are reported the marginal probability effects obtained using a weighted measure
of cumulative precipitation as proxy of pizza demand for the day. Results obtained
using Web search data highlighted that the impact of adverse weather conditions varies
depending on the time of the day, whereas the effects are greater during meal times. In
order to compute cumulative weighted precipitation, previous precipitation in the day
are weighted using the fraction of total orders observed in the corresponding hour over
the entire period11. Overall, estimates reported in Table 6 are consistent with the ones
presented in the previous Table 5. The variables indicating exogenous changes in vendors’
earnings opportunities are statistically significant, whereas target coefficients are not.
[Table 6]
Taken as a whole, these results are in contrast with the estimates of previous section.
10It is worth to notice when the alternative measure is adopted, the results are also qualitatively similar
to those presented in this section.
11In order to avoid endogeneity problems, vendors’ weight are computed using the distribution of total
orders of other vendors
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When truly exogenous demand shifters are used, the behavior of pizza vendors is perfectly
consistent with the predictions of the standard model of labor supply and reference-
dependent preferences play no role in vendors’ labor supply decisions.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I investigate the role of behavioral anomalies in the context of labor supply
decisions. Using high frequency data on pizza sales I study the labor supply behavior
of Bologna Pizza Delivery Vendors. Building on Crawford and Meng’s (2011) analysis,
I show that when targets are defined as average sample realizations of previous labor
supply decisions I find evidence of reference-dependence behavior. Similarly to Crawford
and Meng (2011), the probability of stopping work is higher when vendors hit their target.
However, in contrast to previous works, I am able to identify an exogenous and transitory
demand shifter. Unlike Crawford and Meng (2011), I can investigate the relevance of the
target behavior using precipitation data as instrument for earnings opportunities. When
truly exogenous demand shifters are used the target component plays no role in vendors’s
labor supply decisions and the observed behavior is consistent with the prediction of the
standard model of labor supply.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Pizza Delivery Restaurants and Orders Across the City of Bologna.
Figure 2: Distribution of Orders over the Day.
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 01 03
Clock hour
Orders by Clock hour
14
Figure 3: Number of Rainy Days per Month.
Figure 4: Daily Search Volume for the Words ”Pizza Restaurant Bologna”
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Table 1: Estimates of Google Searches Elasticity - Unweighted Precipitation
(log) Searches (log) Searches (log) Searches (log) Searches
Rainy Day 0.0635**
(0.026)
Total Rainfall in the Day (in mm) 0.0069***
(0.002)
Average Rainfall in the Day (in mm) 0.1671***
(0.055)
Number of Rainy Hours 0.0072***
(0.002)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 546 546 546 546
R-squared 0.7030 0.7046 0.7046 0.7030
Notes: *** Significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10%. Robust standard error are in parentheses. Estimates based on data
on daily search Google Index provided by Google Trends. I used the GI of the Italian word for ”pizza restaurant Bologna” for the period
February 2010 - July 2011. All columns include dummies for day of the week, month, year.
Table 2: Estimates of Google Searches Elasticity - Weighted Precipitation
(log) Searches (log) Searches (log) Searches
Weighted Total Rainfall (in mm) 0.1134**
(0.030)
Weighted Average Rainfall (in mm) 2.7224**
(0.724)
Weighted Number of Rainy Hours 0.1463***
(0.054)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 546 546 546
R-squared 0.7040 0.7040 0.7025
Notes: *** Significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10%. Robust standard error are in parentheses. Estimates based on data
on daily search Google Index provided by Google Trends. I used the GI of the Italian word for ”pizza restaurant Bologna” for the period
February 2010 - July 2011. All columns include dummies for day of the week, month, year.
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Table 3: Marginal Effects on the Probability of Stopping - Crawford and Meng’ Targets
Using vendors and month specific
sample average orders accepted
prior to the current day as target
Using vendors, month and
day-of-week specific sample
average orders accepted prior to
the current day as target
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cum. Orders > Target Orders 0.314*** 0.033*** 0.287*** 0.023***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Cumulative Orders -0.009*** -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rainy Hour -0.011*** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.003)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Log likelihood -52,137.351 -34,539.514 -43,224.88 -28,521.724
Pseudo R2 0.0751 0.3872 0.0704 0.3866
Observation 143,443 143,440 120,210 120,209
Notes: *** Significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10%. Standard error clustered by vendors and day are assumed.
Columns (2) and (4) include dummies for vendors, day of the week, vendors and day of the week, month, year and hour of the day. The
variable Rainy Hour takes value equal to 1 if in the corresponding hour it has rained.
Table 4: Heterogeneous Responses to Demand Shocks - Crawford and Meng’ Targets
Using vendors and month
specific sample average orders
accepted prior to the current
day as target
Using vendors, month and
day-of-week specific sample
average orders accepted prior to
the current day as target
(1) (2)
Above Target 0.220*** 0.164***
(0.013) (0.014)
Cumulative Orders -0.027*** -0.022***
(0.001) (0.001)
Rainy Hour -0.075** -0.099***
(0.030) (0.032)
Above Target * Rainy Hour -0.004 0.024
(0.039) (0.043)
Controls Yes Yes
Log likelihood -34,539.509 -28,521.592
Pseudo R2 0.3872 0.3866
Observation 143,440 120,209
Notes: *** Significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10%. Standard error clustered by vendors and day are assumed.
Columns (2) and (4) include dummies for vendors, day of the week, vendors and day of the week, month, year and hour of the day. The
variable Rainy Hour takes value equal to 1 if in the corresponding hour it has rained.
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Table 5: Marginal Effects on the Probability of Stopping - Target using Rainfall
Using vendors and month
specific sample average
precipitation prior to the
current day as target
Using vendors, month and
day-of-week specific
sample average
precipitation prior to the
current day as target
(1) (2)
Cumulative Rainy Hours > Target Rainy Hours 0.0009 0.0047
(0.002) (0.003)
Cumulative Rainy Hours -0.0173*** -0.0205***
(0.004) (0.005)
Controls Yes Yes
Log likelihood -34,733.543 -28,630.311
Pseudo R2 0.3838 0.3842
Observation 143,440 120,209
Notes: *** Significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10%. Standard error clustered by vendors and day are assumed.
Columns include dummies for vendors, day of the week, vendors and day of the week, month, year and hour of the day.
Table 6: Marginal Effects on the Probability of Stopping - Target using Weighted Rainfall
Using vendors and month specific
sample average precipitation prior to
the current day as target
Using vendors, month and
day-of-week specific sample average
precipitation prior to the current
day as target
(1) (2)
Cumulative Weighted Rainy Hours > -0.0015 0.0033
Target Weighted Rainy Hours (0.002) (0.002)
Cumulative Weighted Rainy Hours -0.1522*** -0.2505***
(0.062) (0.064)
Controls Yes Yes
Log likelihood -34,737.158 -28,631.002
Pseudo R2 0.3837 0.3842
Observation 143,440 120,209
Notes: *** Significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10%. Standard error clustered by vendors and day are assumed.
Columns include dummies for vendors, day of the week, vendors and day of the week, month, year and hour of the day.
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Appendix A1: Demand shocks and labor supply
Adverse weather conditions significantly increase pizza delivery demand. By exploiting
the exogenous increase in food’ delivery demand I am able to provide evidence of the sign
of labor supply elasticity using the following model:
log(Ordersit) = β + β1Rainy Hourt + it (2)
where dependent variable is the (log) number of orders accepted by vendors i in the hour
t12 and the variable Rainy Hour takes value equal to one if in the corresponding hour
interval were observed adverse weather conditions. Table 7 reports the estimates obtained
using two alternative measure of bad weather. The first column reports the variable of
interest takes value equals to 1 if in the hour period were observed more than 0.00 cm
of rain. The coefficient of interest is always positive and statistically significant. Pizza
delivery demand is positively influenced by adverse weather conditions and, consequently,
vendors react by exerting more effort. Similar results are obtained when the variable of
interest is defined as the total amount of rainfall (in millimeters) in the hour interval
(Column 2).
Taken as a whole, the estimates of Table 7 provide evidence of the positive relationship
between labor demand and labor supply of food delivery vendors: vendors work more
when earnings opportunities are higher. It should be noted, however, that these results,
while providing evidence of the positive sign of the labor supply elasticity, are not very
informative. Positive elasticity of labor supply is not inconsistent with the presence of
target behavior. Vendors will not respond to a positive change in labor demand if, and
only if, labor supply decision is exclusively driven by reference dependence preferences13.
Table 7: Vendors’ effort and demand shocks
Rainy Hour 0.045***
(0.007)
Rain (in mm) 0.012***
(0.003)
Controls Yes Yes
R2 0.2990 0.2988
Observation 75,948 75,948
Notes: *** Significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10%. Standard error clustered by vendors and day are
assumed. Column include dummies for vendors, day of the week, vendors and day of the week, month, year and hour of
the day.
12Only hours with at least 1 order were considered.
13In a model of labor supply decisions where total utility is defined as a weighted average of con-
sumption utility and gain-loss utility workers will not respond to demand shock only if the weight of the
gain-loss utility’s weight is equal to one. See Appendix A2.
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Appendix A2: RDP and heterogenous responses to demand shocks
In the following sections I develop two models of labor supply for piece-rate workers that
operate in a market with menu costs. Reference-dependence preferences model predicts
that workers should respond differently to demand shock if they are above the target.
Evidence of the reference dependent preferences in labor supply decision can be obtained
by interacting the dummy variable indicating whether effort exceeds the target with the
rainfall variable. The results reported in Table 4 do not provide such support.
A standard model of labor supply
Pizza vendors operate in a monopolistically competitive framework. The market is char-
acterized by the following demand function:
q = (A− p) (3)
where p and q represent price and quantity of pizza and A>0.
The vendor’s utility is
U = p · q − c(q) (4)
where p and q represent price and quantity of pizza produced and c(q) = θq represents
linear effort cost.
Using (1) and (2) the vendor’s maximization problem can be written as
max
q
U = (A− q) · q − θq (5)
The first order condition of (3) w.r.t. q is
∂U
∂q
= A− 2 · q − θ = 0 (6)
utility maximization yields
q? =
(
A− θ
2
)
(7)
and a price of
p? =
(
A+ θ
2
)
(8)
Consider a demand shock (AR>A) and suppose that the food vendor is able to change
the price but only at a menu cost of z (i.e. the cost of literally printing new menus).
In the presence of menu cost the food vendor might find it optimal to not adjust its price
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to the level
p?R =
(
AR + θ
2
)
(9)
rather, it might choose to keep its price at p? and adjust its output to14
q?R =
(
AR − θ
2
)
(10)
In a market with the presence of menu costs a change in aggregate demand affects quantity
but not prices.
A model with reference-dependent preferences
Following Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) I write the vendor’s total utility V (q|qT ), as a
weighted average of standard utility U(q) and gain-loss utility R(q|qT ), with weights
1− η and η, as follows:
V (q|qT ) = (1− η)U(q) + ηR(q|qT ) (11)
where the gain-loss utility
R(q|qT ) = µ(q − qT ) (12)
where qT is the effort target value15,and µ(·) is a ”universal gain-loss function” that
satisfies the following properties:
• µ(x) is strictly increasing
• µ′′(x) ≥ 0 for x<0, and µ′′(x) ≤ 0 for x>0
The vendor’s maximization problem is
max
q
V (q|qT ) = (1− η) ((A− q)q − θq) + η (µ(q − qT )) (13)
The first order condition of (11) w.r.t. q is
∂V
∂q
= (1− η)(A− 2q − θ) + η (µ′q(q − qT )) = 0 (14)
14I observe such behaviour whenever z > ∆U˜ where ∆U˜ (∆U˜=UR − U˜R = pR · qR −C(qR)− (p · q˜R −
C(qR)).
15Following Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), I model target as set equals to the agents’ rational expectation.
Building on Crawford and Meng (2001), I treat them as point expectations rather than distributions
qT = E(q) =
(
E(A)−θ
2
)
21
I can identify the relation between A and q through 16
∂q
∂A
= −
∂λ
∂A
∂λ
∂q
= − 1− η−(1− η)2 + η (µ′′qq(q − qT )) (15)
if η = 1 (i.e. the standard utility weight is equal to 0):
∂q
∂A
= 0 (16)
if (q − qT ) < 0 (i.e. the vendor is below his target):
∂q
∂A
−
= −
∂λ
∂A
∂λ
∂q
= − 1− η−(1− η)2− η (µ′′qq(·)) (17)
if (q − qT ) > 0 (i.e. the vendor is above his target):
∂q
∂A
+
= −
∂λ
∂A
∂λ
∂q
= − 1− η−(1− η)2 + η (µ′′qq(·)) (18)
and
∂q
∂A
+
<
∂q
∂A
−
(19)
16We indicates λ equation (12)
22
Appendix A3: Weighted Regressions
Table 8: Marginal Effects on the Probability of Stopping - Crawford and Meng’ Targets
Using vendors and month specific
sample average orders accepted
prior to the current day as target
Using vendors, month and
day-of-week specific sample
average orders accepted prior to
the current day as target
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cum. Orders > Target Orders 0.298*** 0.025*** 0.282*** 0.018***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Cumulative Orders -0.008*** -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rainy Hour -0.013*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.003)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Log likelihood -1,044,271.4 -692,525.65 -129,922.3 -86,127.294
Pseudo R2 0.0737 0.3857 0.0721 0.3849
Observation 3,005,049 3,005,038 373,309 373,308
Notes: *** Significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10%. Standard error clustered by vendors and day are assumed.
Columns (2) and (4) include dummies for vendors, day of the week, vendors and day of the week, month, year and hour of the day. The
variable Rainy Hour takes value equal to 1 if in the corresponding hour it has rained.
Table 9: Heterogeneous Responses to Demand Shocks - Crawford and Meng’ Targets
Using vendors and month
specific sample average orders
accepted prior to the current
day as target
Using vendors, month and
day-of-week specific sample
average orders accepted prior to
the current day as target
(1) (2)
Above Target 0.1810*** 0.1348***
(0.016) (0.016)
Cumulative Orders -0.0223*** -0.0184***
(0.001) (0.001)
Rainy Hour -0.1097** -0.1338***
(0.047) (0.049)
Above Target * Rainy Hour 0.0187 0.0488
(0.047) (0.049)
Controls Yes Yes
Log likelihood -692,523.17 -86,125.657
Pseudo R2 0.3857 0.3849
Observation 3,004,038 373,308
Notes: *** Significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10%. Standard error clustered by vendors and day are assumed.
Columns (2) and (4) include dummies for vendors, day of the week, vendors and day of the week, month, year and hour of the day. The
variable Rainy Hour takes value equal to 1 if in the corresponding hour it has rained.
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Table 10: Marginal Effects on the Probability of Stopping - Target using Rainfall
Using vendors and month
specific sample average
precipitation prior to the
current day as target
Using vendors, month and
day-of-week specific
sample average
precipitation prior to the
current day as target
(1) (2)
Cumulative Rainy Hours > Target Rainy Hours 0.0007 0.0012
(0.003) (0.003)
Cumulative Rainy Hours -0.0152*** -0.016***
(0.005) (0.005)
Controls Yes Yes
Log likelihood -694,983.98 -86,337.373
Pseudo R2 0.3835 0.3834
Observation 3,005,038 373,308
Notes: *** Significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10%. Standard error clustered by vendors and day are assumed.
Columns include dummies for vendors, day of the week, vendors and day of the week, month, year and hour of the day.
Table 11: Marginal Effects on the Probability of Stopping - Target using Weighted Rain-
fall
Using vendors and month specific
sample average precipitation prior to
the current day as target
Using vendors, month and
day-of-week specific sample average
precipitation prior to the current
day as target
(1) (2)
Cumulative Weighted Rainy Hours > -0.002 -0.006
Target Weighted Rainy Hours (0.002) (0.002)
Cumulative Weighted Rainy Hours -0.143*** -0.190***
(0.065) (0.065)
Controls Yes Yes
Log likelihood -694,990.47 -86,337.829
Pseudo R2 0.3835 0.3834
Observation 3,005,038 373,308
Notes: *** Significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10%. Standard error clustered by vendors and day are assumed.
Columns include dummies for vendors, day of the week, vendors and day of the week, month, year and hour of the day.
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Appendix A4: First Stage Results
Table 12: First Stage Results - Dependent Variable: Crawford and Meng’s Target
Using vendors and month specific
sample average orders accepted
prior to the current day as target
Using vendors, month and
day-of-week specific sample
average orders accepted prior to
the current day as target
Above Target Above Target Above Target Above Target
Cumulative Rainy Hours > 0.706** 0.172***
Target Rainy Hours (0.033) (0.040)
Cumulative Rainy Hours 0.016** -0.000
(0.006) (0.007)
Cum. Weight. Rainy Hours > 0.094*** 0.145***
Target Weight. Rainy Hours (0.033) (0.034)
Cumulative Weighted Rainy Hours 0.160* 0.068
(0.085) (0.093)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log likelihood -53,572.763 -53,597.279 -48,886.782 -48,871.595
Observations 143,440 143,440 120,190 120,190
R-squared 0.3397 0.3394 0.2923 0.2925
Notes: *** Significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10%. Standard error clustered by vendors and day are assumed.
Columns include dummies for vendors, day of the week, vendors and day of the week, month, year and hour of the day.
Table 13: First Stage Results - Dependent Variable: Cumulative orders
Using vendors and month specific
sample average orders accepted
prior to the current day as target
Using vendors, month and
day-of-week specific sample
average orders accepted prior to
the current day as target
Cum. Orders Cum. Orders Cum. Orders Cum. Orders
Cumulative Rainy Hours > -0.199 -0.161
Target Rainy Hours (0.161) (0.177)
Cumulative Rainy Hours 0.172*** 0.165***
(0.041) (0.043)
Cum. Weight. Rainy Hours > 0.129 0.201
Target Weight. Rainy Hours (0.167) (0.151)
Cumulative Weighted Rainy Hours 1.584*** 1.444***
(0.551) (0.525)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 143,443 143,443 120,210 120,210
R-squared 0.7055 0.7051 0.7179 0.7174
Notes: *** Significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10%. Standard error clustered by vendors and day are assumed.
Columns include dummies for vendors, day of the week, vendors and day of the week, month, year, and hour of the day.
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Out of sight, out of mind: voting behaviour and
random seating arrangements.
Alessandro Saia∗
Abstract
For nearly one hundred years seats in the Chamber of the Icelandic Parliament
have been allocated randomly. Using the entire universe of votes of the Icelandic
Parliament from December 1995 until March 2007, I investigate how the voting
behavior of Members of Parliament is influenced by the Members seating nearby.
By exploiting the random seating arrangements in the Assembly Hall, I show that
being seated next to Members of a different party increases the probability of not
being aligned with one’s own party. Using the exact spatial orientation of the peers,
I provide evidence that supports the hypothesis that interaction is the main channel
that explain our results.
∗Contacts: alessandro.saia@unibo.it.
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1 Introduction
Economists and political scientists alike, have devoted significant effort to investigate the
determinants of Members of Parliament’ voting behavior (Kau et al., 1982; Levitt, 1996;
Snyder and Groseclose, 2000; Hix, 2002; Clinton et al., 2004; and Lee et al., 2004). Every
day, Members of Parliament (MP) face several decisions to make, some of which have a
major social and economic impact. Even if their knowledge can be limited, politicians
are required to vote cast their vote on a variety of subject areas. The crucial question,
then, is: how do members of Parliament vote?
Several studies have provided evidence of the fact that colleagues’ input is among the
most important determinants of MP’s voting decision. Using roll calls taken from 1807
to 1829 of the nascent in American Congress, Young (1966) suggested that living in the
same boardinghouse was a dominant determinant of MPs’ voting behavior. More re-
cently, Masket (2008), using data of the California Assembly from 1941 to 1975, provided
evidence of the fact that legislators sitting next to each other influence each others’ voting
behavior. Cohen and Malloy (2010) obtained similar results, providing evidence of the
strong impact of seat location networks on the voting behavior of US Senators.
However, these studies document a series of suggestive empirical regularities, but they do
not provide causal evidence over the role of colleagues’ influence in MP’ voting decision.
Identification is challenging for two main reasons. First, individuals constantly affect
each other, making the estimation extremely difficult to identify (Manski, 1993). Second,
is extremely difficult to conceive a source of exogenous change in the level of interaction
among Members of Parliament.
In this paper I investigate the extent to which interactions between politicians play a role
in influencing MPs’ voting behavior in the context of the Icelandic Parliament. I overcome
identification issues exploiting a unique feature of the Icelandic Chamber: for nearly one
hundred years, seats in the Icelandic Parliament have been allocated randomly. Unlike
other Parliaments, where seats are assigned on the basis of political membership, the seat
distribution in the Icelandic Chamber is decided by a lottery system. Using the entire
universe of voting procedures held between December 1995 and March 2007, I will exploit
the random seating arrangement to provide evidence for the important role of interaction
spillovers in MPs’ voting behavior. The results suggest that, a Members of Parliament
seated next to Members of a different party are less likely to vote in alignment with
their own party. I argue that the random seating arrangements, by forcing politicians
to interact with Members of different parties, might facilitate a more informal exchange
of ideas. To provide support for the interaction explanation, I exploit the exact spatial
orientation of MP and her peers in the Chamber. The results show that MP’s voting
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behavior is affected by Members of other parties located in the seats in the same row
(right and left) but not in different rows (front and back).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the
institutional background of the Icelandic Parliament. Section 3 describes the data on
votes and on seating plans used in the paper. Section 4 presents the results from the
empirical analysis. The mechanism through which MPs’ influence operates is explored in
Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional Background
The Althingi is the national Parliament of Iceland. It was fully established in 930 and is
one of the oldest extant parliamentary institutions in the world. It exercises legislative
power, jointly with the President of the Republic, and the legislative activities are held
in the Parliament House, at Austurvo¨llur in Reykjav´ık. The 63 Members of the Althingi
are elected by direct universal suffrage through a proportional list system. Deputies are
appointed for a 4-year Legislature, which is divided in 4 sessions. Each session normally
starts on October 1 and lasts for one year.
Unlike other Parliaments of the world, where seats are assigned on the basis of political
membership, the seat distribution in the Icelandic Parliament is decided by a lottery
system1.
”At the commencement of each session Members draw lots for their seats,
with the exception of the ministers who sit in ministerial chairs. When the
drawing of seats begins the Speaker has on his desk a list of members, alpha-
betically arranged by first name. Each member is also given a number, with
the member at the top of the list given the number one. Officials sit on both
sides of the Speaker and they have in front of them a box of balls. Each ball is
marked with a number which corresponds to a particular seat in the chamber.
The Speaker starts the procedure by drawing one ball from the box on his left
side. The number of that ball decides which member will be the first to ap-
proach the Speakers Chair and pick a ball from the box on the Speakers right.
The Speaker then calls other members to the Chair in an alphabetical order,
starting with the member whose name was first drawn. When a member has
drawn a numbered ball the Speakers announces the number of the seat he has
been allocated. Members take their seat accordingly. The officials record the
1The random seat assignment process has been implemented in Iceland for nearly 100 years. Sim-
ilar arrangements were implemented in the Philippines (between 1907 and 1988) and in the House of
Representatives of the United States, from 1845 until 1913.
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drawing. When a member has been assigned a seat he will retain that seat for
the remainder of the legislative session. Drawing of seats has never applied to
ministers, who sit in ministerial chairs, facing the assembly.”
Magnusson, T. (2014)
3 Data
3.1 Voting record
Votes in Althingi had been electronically recorded since October 1991. Members of the
Parliament cast their vote using the ’yes’, ’no’ or ’abstain’ buttons on their desks. I
collect all of the votes in the Icelandic Parliament between December 1995 and March
2007. During that period, a total of 23,547 voting procedures were held and 1,236,326
individual votes were recorded. Table 1 presents the distribution of votes observed (Yes,
No, Absteined, Absence2 and Procl. Absence3).
[Table 1]
High absence levels are due to the fact that Icelandic Parliament may not pass any
resolution unless half the Members are present and participate in the vote, then the
quorum requirement can induce strategic abstention (i.e. MP tries to spoil the outcome
rather than going to the voting procedure to lose the vote).
The term party line votev,p refers to the vote
4 that receives a substantial majority of votes
cast from political party p in each voting session v. I use the term Non-compliancei,v,t
when the vote of MP i, from political party p is different from the corresponding party-
line votev,p.
Table 2 reports the distribution of votes observed in voting procedure where it was possible
to identify a party line vote5. Table 3 and Table 4 contain the distribution of party line
votes and the distribution of non-complied votes (i.e. when MP’s vote is different from
the party-line vote), respectively6.
2Absence is recorded when the MP did not press the button during the vote (i.e. she might not be in
the chamber or she was in the chamber and missed the chance to press a button).
3Procl. Absence is recorded when the MP was not able to attend the meeting (e.g. she might be
overseas on parliamentary business, she might be ill or her child might be sick).
4i.e.Yes, No, Absteined, Absence.
5In the baseline sample I only consider political parties with at least 8 members. The threshold used
to define the party line votev,p is 70%. Results obtained with different cohesion thresholds or group size
are essentially the same.
6The large majority of non-complied votes are composed by absences. In this sense absences can be
considered as the product of a strategic calculus and to be absent from the floor at the time of the vote is
a method of opposing the party position. Previous papers have provided evidence that MPs who oppose
the position taken by their party generally will leave the floor at the time of the vote (Jones and Hwang,
4
[Table 2]
[Table 3]
[Table 4]
3.2 Seating plans
Seating plans for each voting session were obtained from the Althingi’s office, based on
electronic records. I use the term peer group of MP i to indicate the MPs located on
her left, right, front and back7. For each MP, I compute the proportion of peers from a
different party located next to her. I use the term Peer Group Heterogeneity to indicate
the ratio between the number of peers from a different party and the total number of
peers seated nearby.
To give just one example, Figure 2 shows the peer group of MP Hannesson during the
Legislative Assembly 2014-2015. MP Hannesson has 4 peers: one seated in front (MP
Neilsson), one seated behind (MP Gunnarsdo`ttir), one seated on the left (MP Arnadottir)
and one seated on the right (MP Poroarson). Two peers out of four are members of a
political party that is different from Hannesson’s party. Therefore, during the legislative
Assembly 2014-2015, the Peer Group Heterogeneity index for MP. Hannesson takes value
equal to 0.5.
[Figure 1]
[Figure 2]
In the empirical analysis I focus on the voting behavior of the 57 MPs who sit in the
Assembly Hall. I exclude the Prime Minister and the Ministers, who sit in ministerial
chairs and for whom drawing of seats has never applied.
2005).
7Not all MPs have the same number of peers, since the number of peers depends on the seat. The
number of peers varies between 2 and 4.
5
4 Empirical Strategy and Results
I investigate the extent to which being seated next to Members of a different party
increases the probability of not being aligned with one’s own party using the following
model:
Non− complianceiv = αi + β1Peer Group Heterogeneityiv + it (1)
where Non-compliance is a dummy that takes value equals to 1 when the vote of MP i
in voting procedure v is not aligned with one’s own party and Peer Group Heterogeneity
represents the proportion of MPs of a different party located next to her8.
[Table 5]
Table 5 presents the estimates of the reduced form model. The first columns contains only
peer group heterogeneity, number of peers and MP fixed effects. The estimated effect of
the variable indicating the degree of peers heterogeneity is positive and statistically signif-
icant. Columns (2), (3) and (4) include dummies for legislative session, day-of-the-week,
month, year and size of parliamentary group of MP i. The size and significance of the
effect remain unaffected when additional controls are included. The positive coefficient
of Peer Group Heterogeneity suggests that being seated next to members of a different
party increases the probability of not being aligned with one’s own party by around 4%.
Similar results are obtained with different cohesion thresholds (Table 6) or group size
(Table 7).
[Table 6]
[Table 7]
These results suggests that MPs exposed to the opinion of members of other parties are
less likely to vote in alignment with their own parties.
5 Potential channel
In this section I explore the channel through which peers’ influence operate. There are
several channels that could explain results presented in the previous section, but the most
likely mechanism is ideas exchange through face-to-face interaction. The random seating
8As explained in the previous section, I focus on parliamentary groups p with at least 8 Members and
on voting procedure v for which it is possible to identify a party line vote (i.e. the vote that receives the
70% of the total votes cast from party p)
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arrangement force MPs to interact with members of other parties and might promote a
more informal exchange of ideas.
It is reasonable to think that the effect might not be instantaneous and the effect of
peers’ influence might evolve through time. To explore the stability of the effect of peers’
influence over time, I performed a rolling regression exercise. Figure 3 plots the coefficient
of the variable Peer Group Heterogeneity obtained by adding one day to the sample each
time: for example, the 100 data point shows the coefficient estimate based on voting data
from the first day to 100 days after the beginning of the legislative session, the 200 data
point shows the coefficient estimate based on data up to 200 days after the beginning of
the legislative session etc. In the first part of the legislative session the effect of peer group
heterogeneity is not significant statistically. At the beginning of the legislature the fact
of being seated next to members of a different party doesn’t affect MP’s voting behavior.
As time goes by the coefficient of interest starts to become positive and significant. This
pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that the effect of peers’ influence is generated
through repeated exposure and interactions over time.
[Figure 3]
To provide further support for the interaction explanation, I exploit the spatial orientation
of MP and her peers in the Chamber. I argued that the main channel through which
peer group heterogeneity influences MPs’ voting behavior is the face-to-face interaction.
Since it is easier mechanically for a MP to interact with the members of other parties
located in the seats in the same row (right and left) than those in different rows (front
and back), then the role of peers seated in the same row should be different from the role
of peers seated in front and in the back. To test this hypothesis I will exploit the exact
spatial orientation of the peers using the following model:
Non−complianceiv = αi+β1Left−Right Heter.iv+β2Back−Front Heter.iv+it (2)
where the variable Left-Right Heterogeneity indicates the proportion of MP of a different
party seated to the left and to the right and Back-Front Heterogeneity those seated in
the front and behind.
[Table 8]
Corresponding estimates are presented in Table 8. Consistent with our hypothesis the
variable Left-Right Heterogeneity is always positive and statistically significant while the
variable Back-Front Heterogeneity is not. These findings provide further support for the
idea that face-to-face interaction among MPs of other parties is the main mechanism that
explain why politicians seated next to Members of different parties are less likely to vote
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in alignment with their own party.
6 Conclusion
It is generally taken for granted that seating in Parliaments are arranged on the basis
of party membership and Members of Parliaments are grouped together along partisan
lines. The Icelandic case, however, is very different. For nearly one hundred years seats in
the Chamber of the Icelandic Parliament have been determined by lottery. Using a novel
dataset on the universe of votes held from December 1995 until March 2007, I investigate
how the voting behavior of Members of Parliament is influenced by the Members seating
nearby. The results show that being seated next to Members of a different party increases
the probability of not being aligned with one’s own party by around 4%. Moreover, using
the exact spatial orientation of the MPs in the Chamber, I show that MP’s voting behavior
is affected by Members of other parties located in the seats in the same row (right and left)
but not in different rows (front and back). This result is consistent with the hypothesis
that face-to-face interaction is the main mechanism responsible for our findings.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Distribution of Recorded Votes - Full Sample
Type Freq. Percent
Absence 225,606 18.27
Abstained 71,803 5.81
No 54,575 4.42
Procl. Absence 87,245 7.06
Yes 795,675 64.43
Total 1,236,326 100.00
Table 2: Distribution of Recorded Votes - Group size>7 - Cohesion Rate > 70%
Type Freq. Percent
Absence 82,005 14.88
Abstained 30,523 5.54
No 31,405 5.70
Procl. Absence 36,243 6.58
Yes 370,804 67.30
Total 550,980 100.00
10
Table 3: Distribution of Party Line Votes - Group size>7 - Cohesion Rate > 70%
Type Freq. Percent
Absence 1,177 0.21
Abstained 36,338 6.60
No 37,967 6.89
Yes 475,498 86.30
Total 550,980 100.00
Table 4: Distribution of Non-Complied Votes - Group size>7 - Cohesion Rate > 70%
Type Freq. Percent
Absence 81,417 67.16
Abstained 1,487 1.63
No 426 0.41
Procl. Absence 36,243 29.90
Yes 1,087 0.90
Total 121,223 100.00
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Figure 1: Seating Plan - Legislative Assembly 2014-2015 .
Figure 2: Detail Seating Plan - Peer Group of MP G. Hannesson
12
Table 5: Probability of non-compliance
Non-compliance Non-compliance Non-compliance Non-compliance
Peer Group Heterogeneity 0.0330* 0.0365** 0.0370** 0.0366**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Number Peers Yes Yes Yes Yes
MP ID Yes Yes Yes Yes
Legislative Session No Yes Yes Yes
Group Size No No Yes Yes
Month - Year - Dow No No No Yes
Observations 514,737 514,737 514,737 514,737
R-squared 0.0701 0.0738 0.0738 0.0802
Notes: Sample: Group size>7 - Cohesion Rate > 70%. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10%.
Robust standard errors clustered by day and MP are assumed.
Table 6: Probability of non-compliance - Alternative Cohesion Thresholds
60%* 70% 80% 90%
Peer Group Heterogeneity 0.0331** 0.0366** 0.0455** 0.139***
(0.0167) (0.0176) (0.0210) (0.0304)
Observations 673,820 514,737 280,642 99,554
R-squared 0.081 0.080 0.085 0.120
Notes: Sample: Group size > 7. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10%. Robust standard
errors clustered by day and MP are assumed. Regressions include number of peers, group size variable and dummies for
MP, Legislature and day of the week, month, year.
Table 7: Probability of non-compliance - Alternative Cohesion Thresholds and Group
Sizes
Group Size > 6 Group Size > 8 Group Size > 9
(60%) (90%) (60%) (90%) (60%) (90%)
Peer Group Heterogeneity 0.0331** 0.139*** 0.0329* 0.127*** 0.0335* 0.126***
(0.0167) (0.0304) (0.0172) (0.0300) (0.0172) (0.0300)
Observations 673,820 99,554 629,193 92,887 626,104 92,879
R-squared 0.081 0.120 0.083 0.123 0.083 0.122
Notes: *** Significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10%. Robust standard errors clustered by day and
MP are assumed. Regressions include number of peers, group size variable and dummies for MP, Legislature and day of
the week, month, year.
13
Potential Channel: Spatial orientation of the peers
Figure 3: Rolling regression - Peer Group Heterogeneity Coefficient
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Table 8: Probability of non-compliance your own party - Spatial orientation of the peers
Non-compliance Non-compliance Non-compliance Non-compliance
Left-Right Heterogeneity 0.0305** 0.0341*** 0.0342*** 0.0341***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Back-Front Heterogeneity -0.0033 -0.0036 -0.0035 -0.0038
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Number of Peers Yes Yes Yes Yes
MP ID Yes Yes Yes Yes
Legislative Session No Yes Yes Yes
Group Size No No Yes Yes
Month - Year - Dow No No No Yes
Observations 514,737 514,737 514,737 514,737
R-squared 0.0704 0.0740 0.0740 0.0804
Notes: Sample: Group size>7 - Cohesion Threshold > 70%. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the
10%. Robust standard errors clustered by day and MP are assumed.
Table 9: Probability of non-compliance - Spatial orientation of the peers - Alternative
Cohesion thresholds and Group Sizes
Group Size > 6 Group Size > 8 Group Size > 9
(60%) (90%) (60%) (90%) (60%) (90%)
Left-Right Heter. 0.0248** 0.01095*** 0.0290** 0.0997*** 0.0303** 0.0944***
(0.012) (0.022) (0.012) (0.022) (0.012) (0.022)
Back-Front Heter. 0.0035 0.0197 -0.0002 -0.0160 -0.0008 0.0161
(0.011) (0.019) (0.011) (0.020) (0.011) (0.020)
Observations 691,897 99,554 647,270 92,887 644,181 92,879
R-squared 0.081 0.120 0.084 0.123 0.084 0.123
Notes: *** Significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10%. Robust standard errors clustered by day and
MP are assumed. Regressions include number of peers, group size variable and dummies for MP, Legislature and day of
the week, month, year.
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Choosing the open sea:
The cost to the UK of staying out of the Euro
Alessandro Saia∗
Abstract
In this paper we provide an estimate of the trade flows that there would have been
between the UK and Europe if the UK had joined the Euro. As an alternative
approach to the standard log-linear gravity equation we employ the synthetic con-
trol method. We show that the aggregate trade flows between Britain and Europe
would have been 13% higher if the UK had adopted the Euro. Finally, we provide
a new estimate of the Euro’s trade impact for European countries. Our results sug-
gest that the adoption of the single currency led to an increase of intra-European
trade flows between 25% and 53%.
∗Contacts: alessandro.saia@unibo.it. I am particularly grateful to Andrea Ichino and Tommaso Nan-
nicini. I also received useful comments from seminar participants at Bologna and conference participants
at the RIEF Doctoral Meeting and ETSG Leuven.
1 Introduction
Each time we must choose between Europe and the open sea,
we shall always choose the open sea.
Winston Churchill
From an economic point of view, the decision to become a member of the Euro was a gamble.
Whereas the costs were known, the benefits were not. While the loss of the monetary channel
as a tool to stabilize the economy was certain, economists have yet to decide on the benefits
in terms of increased trade and, since its adoption in 1999, the Euro’s effect on trade flows has
been one of highly-debated question in international macroeconomics.
From an empirical point of view the gravity equation constitutes the workhorse in most applied
works1. While the sound theoretical foundation and the strong empirical explanatory power
have lead to its rapid adoption, its ability to identify the effects of currency unions on trade
have displayed several problems. The fragility of the coefficient estimates, that have been char-
acterized for their sensitiveness to the specific sample composition, and the failure to address
endogeneity issues have lead to exploit alternative techniques.
When selection into treatment is not random non parametric techniques offer a valid alternative
to the gravity equation2. By comparing the difference between trade flows of country pair in
the currency union (treated unit) and similar untreated unit (counterfactual unit) it is indeed
possible to estimate the causal effect of currency union on trade. Obviously, these estimates
can be seriously distorted if the treated unit and its potential counterfactual are intrinsically
different and reliability of the results ultimately depends on the selection of a credible counter-
factual. The key is to select a group of country pairs, outside the currency union, that is able
to replicate the trade flows among pairs that have adopted the same currency.
By studying the impact of Euro on trade a natural question to ask is whether trade flows
between members and non-members would have been higher if non-members had joined the
currency union in 1999.
In this paper we study the effect of adopting the Euro on trade flows by looking at one country
that has decided not to join the currency union: the United Kingdom3.
1The first attempt to investigate the Euro’s impact on trade was that of Micco et al. (2003), who put
the Euro effect at about 4% - 16%. Several authors have offered estimates of the effects of the common
European currency. Bun and Klaassen (2007), Baldwin and Nino (2006), Flam and Nordstro¨m (2006),
Frankel (2010) and Bergin and Lin (2012) provide positive estimates, while Berger and Nitsch (2008) and
Silva and Tenreyro (2009) find virtually no significant effect. In Frankel (2010), the author argued, that
the results may well depend on the chosen sample size: the larger the sample, the higher the resulting
estimate of the currency union effect and he puts the Euro effect between 15% and 140%. This pattern
appears similar to that found by Bergin and Lin (2012). Typically findings should not be interpreted
as estimates of the causal effect of Euro, since they fail to address endogeneity concerns. Baldwin and
Taglioni (2007) and Baldwin et al. (2008) provide a broad summary of the literature.
2Persson (2001) and Alesina et al. (2003) provide an excellent discussion of the problem of self-selection
into currency union. Recently, several influential papers have successfully adopted nonparametric match-
ing techniques as an alternative approach to log-linear gravity equations to investigate the causal effect
of currency union (Persson (2001), Chintrakarn (2008)), free trade agreement (Egger et al. (2008), Baier
and Bergstrand (2009)) and other policies aimed at promoting trade (Baghdadi et al. (2013), Chang and
Lee (2011)).
3We know of other studies that share a similar approach. Hashem Pesaran et al. (2007) provide an
2
When Gordon Brown was Chancellor of the Exchequer, he claimed that ”with Britain in the
Euro, British trade with the Euro area could increase substantially - perhaps to the extent
of 50 per cent over 30 years” (Brown (2003)). We investigate Gordon Brown’s prediction by
estimating how much trade would have been if the UK had joined the Euro. In doing so we will
adopt a recent data driven procedure that provides a transparent way to choose counterfactual
units in comparative case studies: the synthetic control method4.
Instead of just comparing the unit of interest to a similar unit, the synthetic control method
provides a systematic procedure to construct a counterfactual as convex combination of con-
trol units. In our case, we apply the synthetic matching to select a weighted combination of
European country pairs that is able to reproduce the trade flows between each European coun-
try and Britain before the introduction of the common currency. Weights are selected using a
transparent data-driven procedure in order to approximate the behavior of the unit of interest
before the introduction of the Euro. The convex combination will represent the counterfactual
version of our untreated unit and it will provide an estimate of the trade that would have been
between the UK and European country if the former had adopted the Euro in 1999. If positive,
the difference between the weighted unit and the actual unit would then suggest that UK’s
decision of not to adopt the single currency came with a cost.
The main advantage of running an analysis of the counterfactual scenario of the UK entry to the
Euro is that the set of potential control units rather than arbitrary selected is de facto restricted
to European countries that have adopted the Euro in 1999. Moreover, by limiting the scope
of the paper to the UK, we focus on a member of the political and economic framework of the
European Union, deeply integrated with others European countries well before 19995. Apart
from the transparent data drive procedure implemented to construct the synthetic counterfac-
tual, the adopted statistical framework relies on weaker identification assumptions allowing for
presence of confounding unobserved time-varying characteristics, where other techniques used
in the literature (fixed effects and difference-in-differences) deal only with time-invariant unob-
servable factors6.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the methodology.
In Section 3 we present our estimates of the cost to the UK of staying of the Euro. In Section
4 we discuss the bias in the results of Section 3 due to general equilibrium implication and we
exploit the flexibility of synthetic matching to provide evidence of the size and the sign of the
estimate of conditional probability distributions for output and inflation related with the UK entry to the
Euro using a Global VAR approach. Micco et al. (2003) extend the scope of their initial paper focusing
on the possible Euro’s effect on the UK, during the period 1999-2001. Their estimates suggest that if
the UK had joined the Euro, its trade flows would have been 7% percent larger in 2001.
4Abadie et al. (2010) and Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) discuss the advantages of this methods. In
recent applications, the synthetic control method has proven to be a valid tool to assess the impact of
policy related events (Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Acemoglu et al. (2013), Billmeier and Nannicini
(2013) and Montalvo (2011)).
5The UK joined the European Economic Community in 1973 and the free movement of goods was
one the cornerstone of the Single European Market.
6Furthermore since weights are restricted to be nonnegative and sum to one, the synthetic control
method safeguards against the risk of parametric extrapolation. See Abadie et al. (2014) for a detailed
discussion of the role of extrapolation in regression analysis.
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bias. In Section 5 we assess the robustness of the previous results conducting an additional
exercise, to obtain Euro’s trade effect estimates for European countries. Section 6 concludes.
2 Methodology
Suppose that we observe X country pairs that adopted the Euro in 1999 and Y country pairs
that have decided to staying out. For each y ∈ Y , we can identify the loss in trade due to the
decision of not to adopt the single currency at time t using:
ηyt = TFyt(e)− TFyt(£) ∀ t ≥ 1999 (1)
where TFyt(e) represents the value of trade flows7 between two countries both adopting the
Euro and TFyt(£) denotes the value of trade between the country pair not sharing the common
currency. Since we are interested in the effect of UK’s decision to not to adopt the Euro, TFyt(e)
and TFyt(£) denote the trade flows between Britain and an European country if the UK would
have joined the Euro and the actual value of trade, respectively. Obviously, we cannot compute
ηyt since for any given year t ≥ 1999 only TFyt(£) is observed.
In order to estimate ηyt we need to formulate a credible counterfactual of TFyt(e), namely a
country pair (or a group of country pairs) that has adopted the Euro in 1999 and it is able to
reproduce the evolution of trade if the untreated country pair would have been treated.
Suppose that for each country pair, the value of TF·t can be given by the following factor model
TF·t(e) = τ·t + δt + θtZ· + λtµ· + ·t (2)
TF·t(£) = δt + θtZ· + λtµ· + ·t (3)
where δt represent an unknown common determinant of trade, Z· is a vector of observed covari-
ates not affected by the intervention8, θt denotes a vector of unknown parameters, µ· denotes
a pair specific unobservable and λt is an unknown common factor that allows for the impact of
7Similarly to other papers (among others Rose (2000), Micco et al. (2003), Tomz et al. (2007), Disdier
and Head (2008) and Baier and Bergstrand (2009)) our variable of interest is the average of two-way
bilateral trade flows. Data on trade flows over the period 1980-2012 are obtained from IMF DOTS
database.
8By assuming that the set of covariates is not affected by the intervention we have to rule out
the possibility of changes in these variables in response to future adoption of the common currency (i.e.
anticipation effects). To be as conservative as possible, all the elements of Z· refer to the matching period
prior to 1999. The final decision about the set of participating countries and the ultimate conversion rates
were formally announced only in mid 1998 and the Euro was introduced, only into financial markets,
on 1 January 1999 and all national currencies were physically three years later. Empirical evidence
on the effect prior the Euro adoption is mixed. Recently Bergin and Lin (2012) studying the dynamic
response of trade to Euro, have provided evidence of a positive effect on overall trade only one year
before currency union adoption while Frankel (2010) shown that the effect on trade become significant
much later. We conducted several robustness exercises with different matching periods, but results do
not change substantively. These results are confined to the Appendix B.
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unobservable pair specific determinants to vary with time.
Abadie et al. (2010) shows that using a vector of weights W ∗ = (w∗1, ..., w∗X) such that
{W ∗} = argmin
{W ∗}
T0∑
t=1
(
Zyt −
X∑
i=1
w∗iZit
)2
(4)
where
∑X
i=1w
∗
i = 1, wi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, ..., X and T0 represents the period before to the
adoption of the common currency, we can estimate
η̂yt = TFyt(£)−
X∑
j=1
w∗i TFit(e) ∀ t ≥ 1999 (5)
Similarly to other matching techniques, the identification assumption of the synthetic control
method is that as long as the synthetic unit provides a good approximation of the untreated
country pair before 1999, any subsequent difference between the actual and the counterfacual
unit should then represent the effect of the UK’s decision of not to adopt the single currency.
If the matching window is large enough the convex combination would be able to resemble the
structural parameters of our unit of interest and to successfully reproduce all the observed and
unobserved determinants of trade for the specific untreated country pair. In order to obtain
the optimal trade-off between computational costs and goodness of fit between the actual and
the synthetic observations we compute the synthetic matching only considering pre-treatment
bilateral flows as observed covariates9.
By summing all UK-European country pairs we are able to provide an estimate of the ag-
gregate cost to the UK of staying out of the Euro. More formally, we can estimate the cost
on trade of the UK’s decision of not to adopt the single currency over the period 1999-2012 using
ĤUK,t =
∑2012
1999
∑Y
p=1 TFpt(£)−
∑2012
1999
∑Y
p=1
∑X
j=1w
∗
piTFpit(e)∑2012
1999
∑Y
p=1
∑X
j=1w
∗
piTFpit(e)
(6)
where
∑Y
p=1 TFpt(£) represents the sum of Anglo-European trade flows and
∑Y
p=1
∑X
j=1w
∗
piTFpit(e)
represents the sum of the corresponding synthetic counterfactuals.
Following Abadie et al. (2010) and Acemoglu et al. (2013) we investigate the statistical signifi-
cance of ĤUK,t through permutation inference. We construct confidence intervals by computing
the cost to the UK of staying out of the Euro for 1,000 placebo groups, where each placebo
group having the size equal to Y. Each counterfactual placebo is computed randomly drawing
a treated country pair from the original control group X and constructing its synthetic coun-
terfactual as a weighted average of the remaining control group units. Our estimate of the cost
to the UK of staying out will be significant at 10% if it does not belong to the interval that
contains the [5, 95] percentiles of the cost of staying out for placebo groups, eliminating from
the 1000 placebo groups those for which the synthetic algorithm fail to provide a good match
9We perform several sensitivity analysis including additional covariates, obtaining similar results.
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during the matching window10.
3 An application of synthetic matching to trade flows
In this section we employ the synthetic control method to provide an estimate of the trade flows
that there would have been between the UK and Europe if the UK had joined the Euro. Our
initial sample contains 9 EMU members (Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Spain, Portugal and Belgium-Luxembourg)11 and the UK, for a total of 45 country pairs,
9 of which were untreated (i.e. each Anglo-European country pair), over a 33-year period, from
1980 to 2012.
Using the matching estimator we construct 9 counterfactual country pairs as a convex combi-
nation of 36 country pairs that have adopted the Euro in 1999. Weights are selected in order
to best approximate the trade flows of the actual untreated units over the period 1980-199812.
Table 1 reports the evolution of bilateral trade for each UK-European country pairs and its
synthetic control units13. The corresponding weights, obtained using the synthetic algorithm,
are reported in Appendix A1.
[Table 1]
The comparison between the solid and dashed line during the matching window provides a
measure of the goodness of fit reached by the synthetic control method. For each untreated
country pair the estimated counterfactual is indeed able to provide a good match and the
two series are fairly similar over the entire pre-treatment period. From 1999 the dashed line
shows the evolution of trade flows if the UK had joined the Euro. In most cases the synthetic
observations closely resemble untreated units well beyond the treatment date. The two lines
start to diverge substantially just after the introduction of the Euro in physical form in 2002
and the synthetic counterfactuals start to outperform the actual observations.
While the ability of counterfactual units to reproduce untreated units it is common among
country pairs, the treatment period displays substantial heterogeneity in terms of gap size
10We arbitrarily set a goodness-of-fit cutoff equal to AVG(τ̂·t) ±
√
2 σ(τ·t), where AVG(·) represents
the average effect during the pre-treatment period for the 9 untreated country pairs and σ(·) is the
relative standard deviation. It exists a trade-off between number of eligible placebo counterfactuals and
goodness of fit during the matching windows (the lower the cutoff, the higher is the similarity during the
pre-treatment between unit of interest and placebo units). We have conducted a variety of robustness
exercises using different thresholds for the cutoff rule and our results do not change substantively.
11In order to have a common treatment date we included only those countries that adopted the Euro
in 1999. Disaggregated trade figures are not available for Luxembourg and Belgium. We have excluded
Ireland due to its specific nature of the Anglo-Irish trade (see Thom and Walsh (2002)). It should be
pointed out that our results are very similar whether we include Ireland. These results are confined to
the Appendix B.
12Similarly to other papers adopting matching estimators (Egger et al. (2008)) pre-treatment period
should be at least as larger as the post-treatment period. We have conducted a variety of robustness
exercises using different samples over various time periods. Our results do not change substantively.
13In each graph the dashed line represents the weighted sum of treated country pairs. For aggregate
figures, the dashed line represents the sum of each synthetic counterfactual.
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among units. Table 2 reports country pair specific results over the period 1999-2012. While
our estimates indicates that the adoption of Euro would have led to an increase in trade flows,
final results may vary somewhat in terms of absolute magnitudes.
[Table 2]
For trade flows between Britain and Finland, France, Italy, Spain and Portugal estimated
counterfactuals greatly outperform actual observations. Estimated impacts for these country
pairs suggest that if the UK had joined the common European currency at the initial stage,
trade between these countries would have been substantially larger. The estimated loss, in
terms of unrealized trade, for the country pairs Britain-Finland and Britain-Portugal is of 45%
and 36%, respectively. For Italy and France, the actual trade with Britain is about one-fifth
lower than the synthetic counterfactual, while for Spain the loss in terms of missing trade is
lower (around 10%)
For the combinations between the Netherlands, Belgium-Luxembourg, Germany and Austria
synthetic units closely resemble the evolution of actual trade flows well beyond the matching
window. Differences between the two series are always negative but smaller than those of first
group.
By summing each untreated units and their synthetic counterfactuals we can derive estimates
for the aggregate trade between Europe and the UK. In Figure 1 we compare the evolution of
the actual and counterfactual aggregate trade (corresponding results are reported in Table 3).
[Figure 1]
[Table 3]
The synthetic unit closely tracks the evolution of the actual untreated unit until 2002 and the
subsequent difference between the two lines indicates the positive potential effect of the adop-
tion of the Euro.
Over the period 1999-2012 the cost, in terms of missing trade, to the UK of staying out of the
Euro is around 13%. Our estimates suggest that the Euro would have started to have strongly
significant effects on trade only after the physical introduction of notes and coins in 2002. Dur-
ing the period 1999-2001, when Euro was de facto an invisible currency only used for accounting
purposes, the difference between our synthetic unit and the aggregate trade flows is small and
not statistically significant. From 2002 to 2012 the effect is sizable, suggesting that the Euro
would have increased the trade flows between the UK and European countries by around 15%.
We examine the robustness of our estimates investigating alternative compositions of our con-
trol group and different sets of trade predictors.
Given the relatively small number of potential control units a valid concern is the fact that our
results are sensitive to the exclusion of any particular country pair. Following Abadie et al.
(2010) we test the sensitivity of our results to change in our control group. We have reproduced
the estimated gap between the aggregate trade between Britain and Europe and each synthetic
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counterfactual, obtained iteratively re-estimating the untreated units and omitting in each iter-
ation a treated unit from the original control group. Our findings are satisfactorily robust and
changes in the control group have negligible impact on our estimates.
Our results are robust to the inclusion of additional variables in the distance minimization
problem. We perform the synthetic matching adding a set of covariates theoretically motivated
by the multilateral resistance terms identified in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). We follow
strictly Baier and Bergstrand (2009), that have identified the sum of logs of country pair GDP,
the log of bilateral distance and adjacency dummy as covariates for conducting their matching
estimation. The inclusion of this additional set of covariates leaves unchanged our estimates,
suggesting that our synthetic counterfactual is indeed able to replicate the structural parame-
ters governing bilateral trade flows for untreated country pairs.
A point worth noting is that, like any other matching technique, synthetic control method relies
on the so-called stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA). That is, we assume that
the common currency only affects trade flows among Euro members and it does not influence
untreated country pairs. The violation of this assumption may arise from various sources and
would generate large biases in our estimates. From the previous figures it emerges that both
actual and synthetic trade shown an increase in their trends after 2002. This pattern tends to
suggest that the Euro might have affected also untreated country pairs, causing a violation of
the no interference assumption.
Like any other nonparametric estimators, synthetic control method is unable to perform general
equilibrium comparative statics. To capture general equilibrium effects a solution is to identify
a system of equations that is able to capture the structural parameters of (world) trade flows.
However, the number of assumptions required by this approach is what a nonparametric esti-
mator is trying to avoid.
In the next section we will exploit the flexibility of the synthetic control method to provide
evidence of the size and the sign of the bias in our estimates.
4 Euro’s effect on trade between members and non
members
Europe’s currency union may have enhanced trade among its members or simply diverted trade
away from third countries. It is clear that whether Euro had diverted trade away from Britain
is our major concern. If Euro had led to significant trade diversion with the UK, our previous
estimates should be interpreted as an upper bound of the true estimate of the cost to the UK
of staying out of the Euro.
Despite the variety of previous results stemming from a wide set of empirical approaches no
consensus has yet emerged on the existence of a negative (or positive) trade effect of Euro for
third countries. To date, empirical estimates suggest that Euro had little or no effect on trade
between members and non-members (see Rose (2000) and Frankel and Rose (2002) among oth-
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ers) and to the best of our knowledge there is no evidence of trade diversion related with the
Euro.
If trade flows between the UK and Europe have been affected by the adoption of the common
currency it also means that Anglo-European pairs were partially exposed to treatment.
In this section, we exploit the flexibility of the synthetic matching proposing an additional em-
pirical exercise designed to derive the direction of the bias, otherwise difficult to evaluate with
other nonparametric techniques.
We perform a second type of exercise by re-estimating a counterfactual version of trade flows
between Europe and Britain using pairs of countries that have not adopted the Euro as po-
tential controls. By considering bilateral flows among extra-European countries, where the no
interference assumption is less likely to be violated, we are able to provide clear a evidence of
both direction and size of the bias, since weighted combination of extra-European units should
represent the counterfactual version of Anglo-European trade without the interference of the
Euro. Any positive gap between the actual untreated trade and this second counterfactual
should be interpreted against the fact that Euro has diverted trade have from UK and it would
provide evidence in favour of the positive effect of Euro on trade between members and non
members.
Apart from providing evidence for the bias in our estimates, this second exercise is meant to be
interpreted as an additional inferential exercise based on the idea of the refutability test14. If
currency union truly increases trade (and if is true that British trade would have been greater
had the UK adopted the Euro), then it must also be true to say that trade between such coun-
tries would have been lower without the existence of the single currency. If the negative gap
between actual British trade and the weighted average of European units truly accounts for
the (potential) effect of the Euro, in this second exercise actual trade should outperform its
synthetic counterfactual, computed as the weighted average of extra-European units.
Our second sample covers 11 extra-European countries (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Iceland,
Japan, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and United States) over the period
1980-201215. Similarly to the previous section we construct the 9 Anglo-European pairs as
weighted average of 55 bilateral trade flows among non-European countries.
Table 4 reports the evolution of bilateral trade for the Anglo-European pairs and their synthetic
control units and country pair specific results, for the period 1999-2012, are reported in Table
516.
[Table 4]
14A well-know example of refutability test is in Freeman (1984). In the paper, the author investigated
the positive effects of a trade union on workers’ wages. If such a positive effect actually exists, then
wages should rise when a worker moves from a non-unionized job to a unionized job, and similarly wages
should fall if a worker moves from a unionized to a non-unionized job.
15Our sample covers extra-European countries that were OECD members over the entire matching
period.
16In the Appendix A2 we report the weighted combinations of extra-European country pairs, obtained
using the synthetic algorithm
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[Table 5]
Overall, observed trade flows outperform their counterfactuals, providing strong evidence against
trade diversion. Similarly to the results obtained in Section 3 we can distinguish two different
groups of countries. The estimates, reported in Table 5, suggest a strong trade creation effect on
trade flows between Britain and the Netherlands, Belgium-Luxembourg, Germany and Austria.
The trade boosting effect of the single currency on trade between the Netherlands is of 27%,
35% for Germany, Belgium-Luxembourg is of 38% and 21% for Austria. Estimated effects for
country pairs France-Britain, Italy-Britain and Spain-Britain suggest a lower but positive ef-
fect, whereas for the combination between the UK and Finland and Portugal our results provide
evidence of trade diversion.
In comparing these results with those obtained in the previous section we find the exact same
pattern but in reverse order. There is a negative association between the estimates for (poten-
tial) Euro trade effect and the estimates for the trade creating effect. While for the bilateral
trade flows between the UK and Germany the trade-creating effects of the Euro was as strong
as if the UK had joined the Euro, for Portugal the result is the opposite.
[Figure 2]
[Table 6]
Figure 2 shows the aggregate bilateral trade between the UK and European countries and its
synthetic counterfactual, obtained by summing all Anglo-European country pairs. During the
entire matching window the dashed line closely resembles the solid line. As in the previous
section, from 2002 onwards, the two trajectories diverge substantially. Whereas in the previous
section the estimated gap was positive, now the actual trade greatly outperform the synthetic
observation.
Estimates reported in Table 6 are very similar to the ones displayed in Table 3 but with opposite
signs. The effect starts to became large and statistically significant after the introduction of
the Euro in physical form. The positive gap between the actual Anglo-European trade and its
synthetic counterpart represents our estimate of the trade creating effect of Euro on bilateral
trade. Aggregate estimates show that the Euro has increased the trade flows between the UK
and European countries by around 21% over the period 1999-2012.
The positive difference between the two series suggests that Euro had great positive effect on
trade between its members and the UK. The strong evidence of trade creation also suggests that
the estimates of the (potential) Euro effect for UK, presented in the Section 3, are conservative,
implying that the cost to the UK of staying out of the Euro was partially reduced by the positive
stimulus to Anglo-European trade associated with the introduction of the common currency.
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5 Euro’s trade effect on European countries
In this section, we conduct an additional empirical exercise by providing an new estimate the
Euro’s trade effect for 9 European countries (Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Spain, Portugal and Belgium-Luxembourg), for a total of 36 country pairs. For
each treated units we construct two different synthetic counterfactuals using two different control
groups. The first control group is made up of 99 partially treated country pairs, that correspond
to the trade flows among 9 European countries and the 11 extra-European countries used in
the previous section. The second group, instead, contains the 55 extra-European country pairs
used in Section 417.
[Figure 3]
[Table 7]
[Table 8]
We plot in Figure 3 the aggregate trade among European countries and the two synthetic coun-
terfactuals.18 The dotted line represents the evolution of the weighted combination of bilateral
trade flows between European and extra-European countries while the dashed line is obtained
using as potential controls extra-European combination only. As in our previous estimates, the
gap between actual and synthetic trade starts to accumulate well beyond 1999 and the series
starts to diverge when the Euro physically replaced the national currencies. From 2002 both
synthetic counterfactuals start to accumulate an increasing gap relative to the treated unit:
while actual trade is characterized by a superior growth path, the two synthetic units experi-
enced a lower upward trend, that leads to an increasing difference between the series.
The two synthetic units are, however, characterized by different growth paths. The counterfac-
tual observation obtained as weighted average of partially treated country pairs experienced an
increase in trade relative to the other counterfactual unit. This pattern is perfectly consistent
with the positive external effect of Euro obtained for the British case and the corresponding gap
between the dotted and the continuous line in Figure 3, should be interpreted as a lower bound
estimate of the true Euro effect. In this case, the estimated effect over the period 1999-2012 is
approximately 25%, fairly similar to the results obtained for the UK in Section 3.
17Extra-European countries are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Japan, Norway, New Zealand,
Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and United States.
18Using as potential counterfactuals the trade flows among European countries and extra-European
countries the synthetic counterfactual is not able to provide a good match during the matching window.
Using the second control group the synthetic matching is not able to find a suitable counterfactual for the
country pair Germany - France. This is due to the fact that the value of trade flows between Germany
and France is far from the convex hull of the trade flows of the potential control units. It is worth to
noting that results reported in Table 7 and 8 are very similar when the country pair Germany-France is
excluded from the 36 initial treated country-pairs.
11
Unlike the first counterfactual, during the period before 1999 the weighted combination of extra-
European country pairs is characterized by a more stable pattern, resembling the pre-treatment
trajectory well beyond the treatment date. As long as the no interference assumption olds, the
difference between the dashed line and the actual unit should be interpreted as the true effect
of the single currency on trade among its members. In this case the point estimate of the effect
for the entire post-treatment period is actually positive and large: 53%.
Taken as a whole, our results reinforce those of the previous sections and suggest that the Eu-
ropean single currency has greatly increased not only the bilateral trade among members, but
also trade flows between members and non-members.
6 Conclusion
In reducing transaction costs, currency union may enhance trade flows among members. Despite
the huge amount of work, no definitive conclusion has been reached so far. In this paper we use
a nonparametric matching technique to provide an estimate of the trade flows that there would
have been between the UK and Europe if the UK had joined the Euro. Using the synthetic
control method, we construct a counterfactual unit for bilateral trade flows between the UK and
each European country, obtained as a convex combination of bilateral flows among European
countries. Our results indicate that aggregate trade flows between Britain and Europe would
have been 13% higher if the UK had adopted the Euro. We performed several robustness exer-
cises, by removing units from the control group, including additional predictors and considering
different matching windows, that support our initial estimates.
Since we are not able to perform general equilibrium comparative statics, we exploit the flexibil-
ity of the adopted statistical methodology to investigate the direction of the bias. We provide
evidence that the introduction of the Euro had a positive impact on Anglo-European trade,
implying that the actual cost of staying out of the Euro has been mitigated.
Finally, we provide a bounded estimate of the impact of Euro on trade for European countries.
We find that the adoption of the single currency led to an increase of trade flows among its
members that ranges between 28% and 53%. While we do also find relevant discrepancies among
country specific effects, taken as a whole our results suggest that Euro has greatly increased not
only bilateral trade among members, but also trade flows between members and non-members.
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Table 1: Trade between the UK and European countries vs synthetic counterfactuals.
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Notes: Outcome: bilateral trade (in billion of $). Solid line: actual trade between the UK and the corresponding European country. Dashed line:
synthetic aggregate trade. Synthetic counterfactuals are constructed as weighted average of European country pairs using as matching window
the period 1980-1998. The grey column represents the period between 1999 and 2002, a transitional period where the Euro was de facto a parallel
currency.
Table 2: Trade between the UK and European countries vs synthetic counterfactuals.
AUT GER ESP FIN FRA ITA NLD PRT XBL
% Diff. Actual vs Synth. -5.2 -1.4 -10.1 -45.1 -24.3 -23.3 - 8.3 -36.2 - 6.0
Notes: The table reports the percentage differences between actual and synthetic aggregate trade over the period 1999-2012 for each
Anglo-European country pair. Synthetic counterfactuals are constructed as weighted average of European country pairs using as matching
window the period 1980-1998.
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Figure 1: Aggregate trade between the UK and Europe vs its synthetic counterfactual.
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Notes: Outcome: bilateral trade (in billion of $). Solid line: actual aggregate trade between the UK and Europe (computed as the sum of
trade flows between each Anglo-European country pairs). Dashed line: synthetic aggregate trade (computed as the sum of synthetic trade
flows). Synthetic counterfactuals are constructed as weighted average of European country pairs using as matching window the period
1980-1998. The grey column represents the period between 1999 and 2002, a transitional period where the Euro was de facto a parallel
currency.
Table 3: Aggregate trade between the UK and Europe vs its synthetic counterfactual.
1980-1998 1999-2012
1999-2012 1999-2002 2002-2012
% Difference Actual vs Synth. 0.31 -12.96** 1.06 -15.17**
Notes: The table reports the percentage difference between actual and synthetic aggregate trade over the corresponding periods. Synthetic
counterfactuals are constructed as weighted average of European country pairs using as matching window the period 1980-1998. Results are
derived from trade flows represented in Figure 1. Confidence intervals were obtained using the method described in Section 2 (***
Significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10%).
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Table 4: Trade between the UK and European countries vs synthetic counterfactuals.
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Notes: Outcome: bilateral trade (in billion of $). Solid line: actual trade between the UK and the corresponding European country. Dashed
line: synthetic aggregate trade. Synthetic counterfactuals are constructed as weighted average of extra-European country pairs using as matching
window the period 1980-1998. The grey column represents the period between 1999 and 2002, a transitional period where the Euro was de facto
a parallel currency.
Table 5: Trade between the UK and European countries vs synthetic counterfactuals.
AUT GER ESP FIN FRA ITA NLD PRT XBL
% Diff. Actual vs Synth. 21.5 35.0 22.8 -28.6 8.9 5.7 27.2 -18.4 37.9
Notes: The table reports the percentage differences between actual and synthetic aggregate trade over the period 1999-2012 for each
Anglo-European country pair. Synthetic counterfactuals are constructed as weighted average of extra-European country pairs using as
matching window the period 1980-1998.
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Figure 2: Aggregate trade between the UK and Europe vs its synthetic counterfactual.
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Notes: Outcome: bilateral trade (in billion of $). Solid line: actual aggregate trade between the UK and Europe (computed as the sum of
trade flows between each Anglo-European country pair). Dashed line: synthetic aggregate trade (computed as the sum of synthetic trade
flows). Synthetic counterfactuals are constructed as weighted average of extra-European country pairs using as matching window the period
1980-1998. The grey column represents the period between 1999 and 2002, a transitional period where the Euro was de facto a parallel
currency.
Table 6: Aggregate trade between the UK and Europe vs its synthetic counterfactual.
1980-1998 1999-2012
1999-2012 1999-2002 2002-2012
% Difference Actual vs Synth. -0.31 21.20*** 4.14 25.03***
Notes: The table reports the percentage difference between actual and synthetic aggregate trade over the corresponding periods. Synthetic
counterfactuals are constructed as weighted average of extra-European country pairs using as matching window the period 1980-1998.
Results are derived from trade flows represented in Figure 2. Confidence intervals were obtained using the method described in Section 2
(*** Significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10%).
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Figure 3: Aggregate trade among European countries vs synthetic counterfactuals.
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Notes: Outcome: bilateral trade (in billion of $). Solid line: actual aggregate among European countries (computed as the sum of trade
flows among European country pairs). Dotted line: aggregate synthetic trade computed as the sum of synthetic trade flows constructed as
weighted combination European-extra-European country pairs. Dashed line: aggregate synthetic trade computed as the sum of synthetic
trade flows constructed as weighted combination extra-European country pairs. Synthetic counterfactuals are constructed using as matching
window the period 1980-1998. The grey column represents the period between 1999 and 2002, a transitional period where the Euro was de
facto a parallel currency.
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Table 7: Aggregate trade among European countries vs synthetic counterfactual.
1980-1998 1999-2012
1999-2012 1999-2002 2002-2012
% Difference Actual vs Synth. -.440*** 53.02*** 4.464 64.26***
Notes: The table reports the percentage difference between actual and synthetic aggregate trade over the corresponding periods. Synthetic
counterfactuals are constructed using as matching window the period 1980-1998. Results are derived from trade flows represented in Figure
3. Confidence intervals were obtained using the method described in Section 2 (*** Significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the
10%).
Table 8: Aggregate trade among European countries vs synthetic counterfactual.
1980-1998 1999-2012
1999-2012 1999-2002 2002-2012
% Difference Actual vs Synth. 8.295*** 24.77*** 6.001*** 28.10***
Notes: The table reports the percentage difference between actual and synthetic aggregate trade over the corresponding periods. Synthetic
counterfactuals are constructed using as matching window the period 1980-1998. Results are derived from trade flows represented in Figure
3. Confidence intervals were obtained using the method described in Section 2 (*** Significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the
10%).
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Appendix A
A1. List of counterfactuals and corresponding weights selected by the SCM’s
algorithm to build the synthetic counterfactual (Donor pool: European coun-
try pairs)
Austria - United Kingdom: Austria - Spain (0.324), Austria - Portugal (0.212), Finland
- France (0.22), Finland - Italy (0.156), France - Netherlands (0.036), Italy - Netherlands (0.052).
France - United Kingdom: Germany - Netherlands (0.139), France - Spain (0.495),
France - Italy (0.294), France - Netherlands (0.072).
Italy - United Kingdom: France - Italy (0.171), Italy - Netherlands (0.622), Spain -
France (0.128), Spain - Italy (0.079).
Germany - United Kingdom: France - Italy (0.476), Germany - France (0.323), Ger-
many - Netherlands (0.036) Spain - France (0.166).
Netherlands - United Kingdom: France - Netherlands (0.845), France - Spain (0.058),
Germany - Netherlands (0.097).
Spain - United Kingdom: Finland - Italy (0.144), France - Spain (0.181), Italy - Spain
(0.094), Italy - Netherlands (0.273), Spain - Netherlands (0.211), Spain - Portugal (0.097).
Portugal - United Kingdom: Austria - Spain (0.21), Austria - Portugal (0.055), Finland
- France (0.332), Finland - Portugal (0.216), France - Netherlands (0.033), Italy - Netherlands
(0.073), Italy - Spain (0.047), Netherlands - Portugal (0.034).
Finland - United Kingdom:Austria - Finland (0.621), Belgium/Luxembourg - Finland
(0.074), Belgium/Luxembourg - Netherlands (0.007), Finland - Netherlands (0.127), France -
Netherlands (0.171).
Belgium/Luxembourg - United Kingdom: Belgium/Luxembourg - Finland (0.428),
Belgium/Luxembourg - France (0.327), Belgium/Luxembourg - Netherlands (0.057), France -
Netherlands (0.186), France - Spain (0.002).
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A2. List of counterfactuals and corresponding weights selected by the SCM’s
algorithm to build the synthetic counterfactual (Donor pool: extra-European
pairs)
Austria - United Kingdom: Australia - Switzerland (0.178), Canada - Norway (0.081),
Canada - Switzerland (0.044), Denmark - Norway (0.03), Denmark - Sweden (0.022), Iceland -
United Kingdom (0.542), Japan - United Kingdom (0.063), Switzerland - United States (0.027),
United Kingdom - United States (0.014) .
France - United Kingdom: Canada - United States (0.042), Japan - United Kingdom
(0.737), Japan - United States (0.052), United Kingdom - United States (0.169) .
Italy - United Kingdom: Denmark - Sweden (0.265), Japan - United Kingdom (0.572),
Japan - United States (0.15), United Kingdom - United States (0.013).
Germany - United Kingdom: Denmark - Sweden (0.265), Japan - United Kingdom (0.201),
Japan - United States (0.311), United Kingdom - United States (0.223).
Netherlands - United Kingdom: Australia - Japan (0.033), Canada - Japan (0.078),
Denmark - Sweden (0.382) , Norway - United Kingdom (0.213), Japan - United States (0.052),
United Kingdom - United States (0.242).
Spain - United Kingdom: Canada - Norway (0.727), Canada - United States (0.033),
Japan - United Kingdom (0.24).
Portugal - United Kingdom: Australia - Swizerland (0.082), Canada - Norway (0.381),
Denmark - Norway (0.107), Denmark - United Kingdom (0.025), Iceland - United Kingdom
(0.262), Japan - Switzerland (0.04), Japan - United Kingdom (0.089), United Kingdom - United
States (0.013).
Finland - United Kingdom: Australia - Canada (0.284), Australia - New Zealand (0.194),
Canada - United Kingdom (0.052), Denmark - Sweden (0.067), Japan - Sweden (0.045), Sweden
- United Kingdom (0.083), Sweden - Switzerland (0.132), Switzerland - United Kingdom (0.143).
Belgium/Luxembourg - United Kingdom: Australia - Japan (0.384), Canada - Japan
(0.191), Japan - United States (0.033), Japan - Switzerland (0.06), Switzerland - United King-
dom (0.332).
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Appendix B
B1. Alternative matching window: 1980 - 1995.
Figure 4: Aggregate trade between the UK and Europe vs its synthetic counterfactual.
Control group: European country pairs.
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Notes: Outcome: bilateral trade (in billion of $). Solid line: actual aggregate trade between the UK and Europe (computed as the sum of
trade flows between each Anglo-European country pair). Dashed line: synthetic aggregate trade (computed as the sum of synthetic trade
flows). Synthetic counterfactuals are constructed as weighted average of European country pairs using as matching window the period
1980-1995. The grey column represents the period between 1999 and 2002, a transitional period where the Euro was de facto a parallel
currency.
Table 9: Aggregate trade between the UK and Europe vs its synthetic counterfactual.
Control group: European country pairs.
1980-1998 1999-2012
1999-2012 1999-2002 2002-2012
% Difference Actual vs Synth. 1.65 -11.5** 5.46 -14.11**
Notes: The table reports the percentage difference between actual and synthetic aggregate trade over the corresponding periods. Synthetic
counterfactuals are constructed as weighted average of European country pairs using as matching window the period 1980-1995. Results are
derived from trade flows represented in Figure 1. Confidence intervals were obtained using the method described in Section 2 (***
Significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10%).
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B2. Alternative sample composition
Potential counterfactuals: 10 European countries (Austria, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Belgium-Luxembourg and Ireland).
Figure 5: Aggregate trade between the UK and Europe vs its synthetic counterfactual.
Control group: European country pairs.
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Notes: Outcome: bilateral trade (in billion of $). Solid line: actual aggregate trade between the UK and Europe (computed as the sum of
trade flows between each Anglo-European country pair). Dashed line: synthetic aggregate trade (computed as the sum of synthetic trade
flows). Synthetic counterfactuals are constructed as weighted average of European country pairs using as matching window the period
1980-1998. The grey column represents the period between 1999 and 2002, a transitional period where the Euro was de facto a parallel
currency.
Table 10: Aggregate trade between the UK and Europe vs its synthetic counterfactual.
Control group: European country pairs.
1980-1998 1999-2012
1999-2012 1999-2002 2002-2012
% Difference Actual vs Synth. .31 -9.72* 5.46 -12.1*
Notes: The table reports the percentage difference between actual and synthetic aggregate trade over the corresponding periods. Synthetic
counterfactuals are constructed as weighted average of European country pairs using as matching window the period 1980-1998. Results are
derived from trade flows represented in Figure 1. Confidence intervals were obtained using the method described in Section 2 (***
Significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10%).
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